Anders konnte zumindest ich mir nicht erklären, warum lange Zeit vielfach und wiederholt jedwede Auswirkung des Doppelbeschlusses bzw. dessen Anbahnung auf die sowjetische Militärintervention in Afghanistan bzw. dessen zeitlichen Beginn ausschlossen wurde, obwohl das bei einer Betrachtung der komplexen politisch-militärischen regionalen und globalen Lage der damaligen SU durchaus möglich war bzw. nahe liegt.
Kein Zufall war auch, daß die endgültige Entscheidung zum Einmarsch der Truppen am 12. Dezember 1979 gegen Ende des Tages fiel. Kurz zuvor wurde der am gleichen Tag durch den Rat der NATO verabschiedete Beschluß über die Stationierung amerikanischer Mittelstreckenraketen in Europa in Moskau bekannt. Alle Argumente, welche negativen Folgen ein Einmarsch sowjetischer Truppen für die Beziehungen zwischen der UdSSR und dem Westen haben könnte, wurden dadurch unterminiert, daß diese Beziehungen sich ohnehin bereits verschlechtert hatten.
Quelle: Einführung https://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html ... ember 1979 / Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (BSB, München)
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Ein einführender Kommentar ("Einleitung"!) erläutert jeweils in deutscher und russischer Sprache, warum und wofür das ausgewählte Dokument ein "Schlüsseldokument" ist, berichtet über den Stand der Forschung und gibt Hinweise auf weiterführende Quellen und Literatur.
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Hier eine Auswahl an weiteren geschichtswissenschaftlichen Sekundärquellen, welche ebenfalls einen Zusammenhang zwischen Nachrüstungsbeschluß am 12.12.79 und der Militärintervention der SU in Afghanistan wenige Tage später postulieren.
ALEXANDER A. LIAKHOVSKY, Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979. In: Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #51, Washington D.C, January 2007. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 76 S.
S. 17:
"On 8 December a meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office (the so-called “Walnut Room”), in which a “narrow circle of people” took part – Andropov, Gromyko, Mikhail Suslov, and Ustinov. They discussed the situation for a long time and weighed the pros and cons of deploying of Soviet troops. As evidence for the need for such a step Andropov and Ustinov could cite: the efforts of the US CIA (particularly Paul Henze, the Chief of Station in Ankara) to create a “New Great Ottoman Empire” including the southern republics of the USSR; the lack of a reliable air defense system in the south and thus, in case American “Pershing” missiles were stationed in the DRA" [Afghanistan]", many vitally important objects such as the Baykonur Cosmodrome would be placed in jeopardy;" […]
S. 20:
[…] "The decision of NATO foreign affairs and defense ministers at a meeting in Brussels on 12 December became the last drop tipping the scales in favor of the deployment of troops. They approved a scenario for stationing new American medium-range cruise and Pershing-2 missiles in Western Europe." […]
S.21:
"The same day this information arrived the CC CPSU Politburo – rather its elite, Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko – unanimously made the final decision about the deployment of troops to Afghanistan. In their belief, after the NATO decision to station medium-range missiles in Europe aimed at the USSR there was nothing to lose…"
GERAINT HUGHES, The Soviet–Afghan War, 1978–1989: An Overview. In: Defence Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2008), pp. 326–350.
S. 331:
[…] "For Andropov, Ustinov and other proponents of intervention, the imminent collapse of the PDPA regime, and developments in the international sphere, justified a military response. In his talks with Taraki in March" [1979] "Kosygin had cited the negative implications intervention would have for Soviet foreign policy in general. By the autumn of 1979, however, the ‘hawks’ saw this argument as moot. Détente with the West had faltered, NATO was planning to introduce medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, and the US Senate was reluctant to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II Treaty concluded by Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter at Vienna (June 1979). "[…]
ARTEMY M. KALINOVSKY, A long goodbye. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Cambridge 2011.
S. 21:
S. 23:[…] "Ustinov and Andropov met with Brezhnew on December 8, 1979, to advance the case for intervention. Their arguments pointed out that, realigned toward the West, Afghanistan could well become the staging area for missiles directed at the Soviet Union. Once Brezhnev's support hat been secured, only the formal matter of a Politburo resolution remained. On December 12, the Politburo met for a brief session and approved a handwritten resolution entitled 'Concerning the Situation in A'." […]
[…] "Ogarkov's arguments failed to impress the Politburo members, who already decided on intervention. Although in March similar arguments had persuaded them to reject military intervention as an option, now the seemingly saw no other way to handle the situation. The failure of the US Congress to ratify SALT II in the summer of 1979, which seemed to signal an American turn away from détente, was on reason. The US decision to deploy Pershing missiles in Europe was another."
STEPHANIE FREEMAN, The Making of an Accidental Crisis: The United States and the NATO Dual-Track Decision of 1979. In: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 25:331–355, 2014.
S. 332:
"The NATO dual-track decision" [12.12.1979] "led to the outbreak of the Euromissiles crisis, which raged from 1979 to 1983. The Soviets refused to participate in arms control negotiations on theatre nuclear forces for nearly two years, which further damaged the already strained state of superpower relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the end of détente. The dual-track decision had been the “last drop tipping the scales” that prompted Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to approve the Afghan operation, as he feared that the United States could next deploy short-range missiles on the Soviet Union’s southern border in Afghanistan."
Es versteht sich von selbst, dass die Anbahnung bzw. die Verabschiedung des Nato-Doppelbeschlusses nur ein Auslöser von weiteren darstellen wird, von den diversen anderen Ursachen/Gründen der sowjetischen Militärintervention in Afghanistan ganz abgesehen.